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Abstract. Board Structure (Board Size and Board Independence) of banks is an essential ingredient for ensuring 
healthy financial intermediation as well as effective management of banks’ asset quality. However, the asset quality 
of banks in Nigeria continues to deteriorate even amidst various efforts by regulatory authorities to sanitize the 
Nigerian banking industry. It is on the strength of this backdrop that this study examined the impact of Board 
structure (Board size and Independence) on the asset quality NPL and LDR) of listed deposit money banks in 
Nigeria for a period of 10 years (2008-2017). Data for the study were quantitatively retrieved from the annual 
reports and accounts of the fifteen (15) studied banks. Various robustness tests were carried out to ascertain; the 
existence of multi-collinearity or otherwise, fitness of the model and to establish the appropriate regression analysis 
that befits the study. Descriptive statistics, correlation and OLS Robust regression were used to describe and 
analyze the data. It was found that board structure proxies showed no significant impact on Asset Quality. The study 
therefore recommended among others that; board independent directors should be encouraged to take their 
responsibilities seriously in order to help improve banks’ asset quality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
       All over the world organizations 
continuously strive to improve the mode, 
structure, process and architecture of their 
operations in order to grow the organization and 
remain competitive. Achieving this requires 
good corporate governance particularly where 
ownership is separated from management 
especially in the banking industry where funds 
are mobilized from surplus sectors to deficit 
sectors of the economy through financial 
intermediation. The relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate 
performance has received tremendous attention 
from both academics and practitioners as a 
result of continuous corporate failure across the 
globe which threatened investors‟ confidence. 
       Demaki (2011) posited that the crisis that 
rocked United States of America Energy 
Corporation (ENRON) in 2001 and the crash in 
the sub-prime mortgage institution which led 
to the global financial crisis were all due to 
corporate governance failure. Alfaki (2007) 
added that, the East Asian financial crisis was 
as a result of poor corporate governance in 
the financial system and that the crisis had 
some painful economic and social 
implications on the region.  
      According to Ahmad (2013), the 
contagious financial crisis which started in 
America, spread to other parts of the world 
and Africa, particularly Nigeria was not 
speared as the crisis unleashed untold 
financial distress on many „too big to fall‟ 
financial institutions.  
This position was further alluded to by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in 2003, that financial sector lacks corporate 
governance as a result of the fact that, only 
40% of quoted companies in the Nigeria 
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Stock Exchange (SEC) including banks have 
recognized code of corporate governance. 
Consequently, the commission in 2003 rolled 
out code of best practices to guide the 
operations of quoted companies. The continuous 
failure of financial institutions in Nigeria as a 
result of poor application or non-existence of 
effective corporate governance mechanisms and 
its multiplier effects on the real sector of the 
economy remain unhealthy for a developing 
nation like Nigeria (Daniya, Adeyeye, Ndibe & 
Dokochi, 2016).  
       According to Mohammed (2012), poor 
application of corporate governance has adverse 
effects on asset quality as managers continue to 
give loans without following the laid down 
rules. Also, among several factors which 
account for continuous distress and poor 
performance in banks, asset quality remains the 
hall-mark (Abdulatif, et al., 2014).  
Ben, Olufemi, Patrick, and James (2010) 
reported that, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
between August and October, 2009 dismissed 
eight (8) chief executives and executive 
directors of some Nigerian banks due to issues 
related to poor asset quality resulting from 
failure to observe corporate governance 
principles, having conducted investigation to  
ascertain the soundness or otherwise of financial 
institutions in Nigeria. The report of the 
investigation revealed that, banks that were 
found culpable have acted in manners 
detrimental to the interest of depositors and 
shareholders.  
      In order to sanitize the banks and salvage 
them from total collapse owing to increasing 
rate poor asset quality, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) came up with various 
institutional arrangements aimed at protecting 
investors and depositors of their hard earned 
investment from the ungodly practices of 
managers and directors of banks in Nigeria. 
According to Olayinka (2010), prominent 
among the institutional arrangement was the 
issuance of code of corporate governance in 
2006 to complement the existing corporate 
governance code and the provisions of the 2006 
code of corporate governance were considered 
indispensable in achieving viable and successful 
banking practice in Nigeria.  
      Since the issuance of the code of 
corporate governance, several researchers 
have examined its effects on corporate 
performance especially in the banking 
industry. Existing literature on corporate 
governance concentrated on measuring 
various aspects of banks‟ performance. 
However, asset quality being a vital aspect of 
bank operational activities has not been given 
the desired attention in the literature.  
       In order to enhance the quality of assets 
of banks and maintain healthy agency 
relationship, the structure of the board which 
has to do with board size and board 
independence is indispensable (Ping-Fu, 
2014). It is on the strength of this background 
that this study examined the impact of Board 
Structure on the asset quality of deposit 
money banks listed on the Nigeria stock 
exchange. 
       Based on the foregoing, this study has the 
primary objective of examining the impact of 
Board Structure on asset quality of listed 
deposit money banks in Nigeria. Other 
specific objectives are: 
To determine the impact of Board Size on the 
Asset Quality of deposit money banks in 
Nigeria and to ascertain the impact of  Board 
Independence on Asset Quality of deposit 
money banks in Nigeria. 
       This paper is structured into five parts: 
Introduction as above, Review of relevant 
literature, Methodology, Results and 
Discussion and Conclusion/ 
Recommendations.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
       This segment of the study will review 
relevant literature in the area of corporate 
governance with particular emphasis on board 
structure and asset quality of deposit money 
banks. Issues to be discussed herein will be 
done conceptually, theoretically and 
empirically. 
 
The Concept of Asset Quality of Banks 
       A stable banking system is required for 
efficient financial intermediation. Banks 
unlike manufacturing companies sell credit, 
and it is through the sale of credit that profit 
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is made via interest charged on loans. Loans and 
advances represent an important assets owned 
by the banks. Hence, the need to effectively 
manage it is core to achieving the objective of 
any bank (Mabvure, Gwangwava, Faitira, 
Mutibvu & Kamoyo, 2012).  
        As banks continue to trade on credit/loan, 
they are always vulnerable to risk of default 
from borrowers (Mabvure et al., 2012). Among 
the risks faced by banks, credit risk plays a 
major role in bank‟s financial performance 
when the “product” (Loan) it sells fails to yield 
income. Hence, the bank is meant to face high 
level of non-performing loans which further 
deteriorates its asset quality (Drehman, Soresen 
& Stringa 2008). Kolapo, Ayeni and Oke 
(2012), Mabvure et al. (2012), Sekar and 
Balachandran (2014), Sonia and Monik (2014) 
and Abdullatif, Freeman and Michael. (2014) 
explained that asset quality is a function of loan 
portfolio quality of banks which is measured by 
its non-performing loan (NPL). In defining non- 
performing loan, they explained that a loan is 
said to be non-performing when the interest and 
the principal remain unpaid for three months or 
ninety (90) days. In other words, it is a loan that 
is 90 days or more delinquent in both repayment 
of interest and the principal. 
        When loans are adjudged non-perfuming, it 
will reduce income generating potential of 
banks. Sekar and Balanchandran (2014) further 
added that „good banks can be ruined by bad 
loans. Monika (2014) also stated that non 
performing asset is a virus affecting the banking 
sector as it affects liquidity, profitability and 
truncate survival.  
        The chief source of loan default as posited 
by Keeton (cited in Addulatif et al., 2014) is 
information imbalance in credit market. As a 
result of information asymmetry banks are 
likely to give loans to high risk clients simply 
because they can afford high loan prices 
required by the banks. When such high risk 
borrows invest in high and uncalculated risky 
ventures, the chance of loan default is 
aggravated. According to Abdulatif et al. 
(2014), management failure to observe or follow 
strictly the code of corporate governance is 
endemic in the Nigerian financial institutions 
and this has led to the continuous decrease in 
asset quality of banks 
 
Measurements of asset quality 
       There are various ways through which 
the asset quality of banks is measured and 
according to (Ping-Fu 2014), the essence is to 
establish the degree of risk that banks, 
shareholders and customers are expose to as a 
result of loan default. He therefore indentified 
key measures of asset quality of banks to 
include: Non-performing loans, Loan to 
deposit ratio and non performing loan to asset 
ratio. According to Eduardus, Hereindito, 
Putu and Supriyatna (2007) the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) requires that banks should 
maintain the level of non-performing loan 
below 5%, while loan to deposit ratio is to be 
kept below 85%.  Banks with lower ratio of 
loans to total assets have better asset quality 
than banks with higher ratio of loans to total 
assets (Khalid, 2012). 
 
Board Structure of Nigerian Banks 
       The board structure of corporate 
organizations is central to realizing the goals 
of corporate governance practice. Semiu and 
Eyasan  (n.d.) contends that while the chief 
role of the board of directors is to ensure and 
provide high level counseling and oversight 
to management, corporate internal control 
problems often emanate from the board of 
directors. He further added that the size, 
composition and separation of the functions 
of the chief executive officer and that of 
board chairman are designed to achieve 
effective board practice. The board structure 
of Nigerian banks used in this study are 
Board size and Board Independence. 
 
Board Size 
       The code of corporate governance (2006) 
specified that board size should not exceed 
twenty (20) members. The choice of board 
size therefore is at the whim and caprice of 
the banks. However, a number of arguments 
have been put forward by scholars as to 
which (Small board size or large board size) 
leads to effective and efficient board practice. 
Yermack  (as cited in Kajola, 2008) and 
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Sanda, Mikailu and Garba (2005) argued that 
small board size is more effective than larger 
board size. The reasons adduced for this view 
are in two folds. First, small board size fast-
tracks decision making process and reduce 
obstacles to positive change. The second reason 
in favor of small board size is that directors 
hardly challenge the policies of the top 
management and that this problem tends to be 
on the rise with the increase in the number of 
directors. 
       Uwuigbe (2011) placed his argument in 
favor of small board size by explaining the 
adverse effect of large board size on the value of 
the firm. He posited that large board size affects 
the value of firm negatively because of high 
agency cost among members of the board and 
concluded that small boards are highly efficient 
in decision making with reduced agency cost, 
which lead to effective corporate governance 
practice. 
       Corporate governance literature also 
revealed arguments in favor of large board size. 
Zahra and peace (as cited in Uwuigbe, 2011) 
explained that larger board has a wide range of 
expertise that facilitates better decisions and as a 
result of the board‟s collective strength, 
irrational decision of the CEO can be resisted. 
Subscribing to this submission, Lubabah and 
Bawa (2013) opined that the CEO‟s inability to 
influence the board can increase board‟s 
effectiveness in monitoring managers and 
reducing irregularities within the organization.  
John (2010) added that larger board size 
enhances ethical practice in an organization. It is 
very clear from the arguments that there is no 
balanced position as to what constitutes efficient 
board size. To this end, one can argue that since 
corporate governance is aimed at reducing 
agency problems, a moderate, effective and less 
expensive board size will lead to the realization 
of the required practice. 
 
Board Independence 
        Board Independence is another variable 
that explained the board structure of an 
organization. The composition of the board or 
board independence is the way in which a board 
is arranged. The 2006 code of corporate 
governance emphasized that the number of non-
executive directors on the board should be 
more than the number of executive directors. 
The implication of this is that more outside 
directors are required on the board to propel it 
towards realizing the goal of the board. 
Mansur and Ahmad (2013) opined that 
shareholders wealth is affected by the 
proportion of outside directors sitting on the 
board. In the same vein, Terzungwe and 
Simon (2013) posited that firms with greater 
proportion of independent directors are 
assigned higher bound and credit rating 
respectively.  
        Demaki (2011) argued that directors 
who are independent of the management have 
ways of taming the activities of the 
management to suit the interest of the 
company. Enhanced directors‟ independence 
is unarguably appealing because directors 
with ties to the firm will find it difficult to 
refuse the excessive pay package of the 
directors and bring to bear the ideas that lead 
to effective monitoring of the management 
(Kajola, 2008). 
        Sanda et al, (2005) suggested that unlike 
inside directors, independent or outside 
directors are better able to challenge the chief 
executive officer on matters that may have 
adverse affects on the organization. In 
recognition of the importance of outside 
directors a minimum of three (3) independent 
directors are required to sit on the board of 
organizations in UK while two-third of 
independents directors are required in US 
firms (Bhagat & Black, as cited in Sanda et 
al. 2005). Lubaba and Bawa (2013), John 
(2010) and Bernard, Husong and woochang 
(2012), argued that firms with more 
independent directors have lower incidence of 
accounting fraud and earnings management. 
        Nasir, Najeeb and Saqlain (2014) argued 
that top managers are faced with dynamic 
checking and are compelled to bring the full 
weight of good corporate governance into 
corporate management when their 
performance is measured or cheeked by 
outside directors. With the knowledge, vision 
and expertise of independent directors, 
management is unlikely to be misguided in 
the implementation of its fiduciary functions 
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which will go along ways in mitigating agency 
problem between the management and 
shareholders.  
        Despite the enormous arguments in favour 
of independent directors other scholars such as 
Bawa and Lubabah (2013) and Adeusi, Akeke, 
Aribaba and Adebisi (2013) are of the opinion 
that outside directors can worsen the 
performance of organizations since most of 
them are appointed on political affiliation rather 
than on the basis of merit. They further added 
that outside directors increase agency cost since 
they have to be compensated for their services. 
There are mixed reactions from scholars 
regarding the composition of the board. 
However, while board composition is a recipe 
for good corporate governance, selection and 
appointment of independent board members 
should reflect merit, competence and experience 
of individuals to be appointed.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
       Relevant concepts with respect to board 
structure and asset quality of deposit money 
banks have been reviewed. It has been 
established that the nature of banking practice 
is not same with the operation of 
manufacturing companies. Banks, in the 
ordinary course of their business continue to 
sell loans in order to make profit via interests 
charged on loans and as such, are faced with 
high level of risk through loan administration 
(Abdulatif, et al., 2014). It is the high level of 
loan default that leads to bank distress which 
makes it difficult for many banks to live up to 
the expectation of the depositors and 
shareholders  (Hifza & Aqeel, 2014). While 
the structure of the board is expected to 
influence the quality of assets of the studies 
banks, the study also envisaged other factors 
other than board structure (Firm size and 
Age) to have influence on banks‟ asset 
quality. The relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables as well 
as the control variables for the study is 
depicted in the framework below. 
 
Independent variables                  Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Authors’ construct
Theoretical Framework 
        Smith 1976 was the earliest known 
economist that addressed the theoretical issues 
of the role of board of directors in the 
governance of firms (Eyesan & Semiu, 2013). 
Smith further observed that as a result of the 
fact that managers control resources other than 
theirs, it should not be expected that they will 
watch over the business with anxious vigilance 
as possibility of negligence abound which is 
the direct consequence of separation of 
ownership from control which is very common 
in modern corporation (Sanda, et al., 2005). 
There is therefore the need to explain the 
theoretical underpinning of owners‟ and 
managers‟ relationship in organizations. 
Theories which underpin corporate governance 
BOARD STRUCTURE 
 Board size (BS) 
 Board independence 
(BI) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 Firm Size (FS) 
 Firm Age (FA) 
ASSET QUALITY 
 Non-Performing Loans 
(NPL) 
 Loan to Deposit Ratio 
(LDR) 
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practice in organizations include and not 
limited to the following: 
 
The Stewardship Theory 
       Akingunola, Olusegun and Adedipe 
(2013), explained that managers are good 
stewards who diligently work to attain high 
level of profit, ensure appealing returns to 
shareholders and who continuously propel the 
organization towards realizing its desired 
objectives. This theory is based on the 
assumption that managers are motivated by 
achievement. Non-executive directors on the 
board serve this purpose better. Managers 
recognize the importance of the structure that 
empowers the steward by offering maximum 
control of the organization which is built on 
trust (Uwuigbe, 2011).  
       In furtherance to this position, Khalid 
(2012) posited that for managers to protect 
their reputations as experts in decision making 
process, they are unreservedly inclined to 
operating the firm in a manner that satisfies all 
performance indicators. Stewardship theory 
according to Muth and Donaldson (as cited in 
Uwuigbe, 2011) is a sociological theory which 
is alternative to agency theory that serves as 
prediction about the structure of effective 
boards for optimal performance. There is still a 
reservation as to whether managers quest to 
run the organization well (Stewardship) is to 
the well being of stakeholders or not. An 
organization can be effectively and efficiently 
managed by applying the principles of 
corporate governance to enhance the asset 
quality of banks, but the multiplier effect of the 
benefit accruing to the organization will not be 
felt proportionately by the owners and other 
stakeholders.  
 
The Stakeholders Theory 
       This theory states that the firm is a system 
operating within a larger system of the society 
which provides the required legal and market 
infrastructure for the firm to thrive. The 
purpose of the firm in this case is to serve the 
general public who may have direct or indirect 
relationship with the firm. The management 
and the provision of information should be 
directed to satisfying the interest of all 
shareholders. Stakeholders‟ theory sees the 
existence of firms to be solely for the creation 
of wealth and value for various stakeholders 
(Akingunola, et al., 2013). 
       The theory further states that there should 
be a provision of enhanced ownership-like 
incentives for all the participants who 
contribute in any form towards the effective 
running of the organization (Segun, Temitope 
& Bolanle, n.d.). The interests of various 
parties in an organization vary from one 
stakeholder to the other. For instance, while 
equity holders may welcome investments in 
high yielding but risky projects, such 
investments may threaten the interest of debt 
holders particularly when a firm is struggling 
on the edge of bankruptcy. In banks , there are 
various interest groups such as shareholders, 
depositors, borrowers, host community, 
independent directors whose interests may 
need to be protected  and having multiple 
interests to confront with can ignite conflict as 
managers would not have clear focus on 
individuals whose contributions and activities 
are of great importance to bank. 
 
Agency Theory 
      Agency theory is rooted in economic 
theory and has dominated the corporate 
governance literature. The theory sees 
shareholders as the principals and managers as 
agents. Sanda et al. (2005) explained further 
that the presence of information asymmetry 
can make agents to pursue interest that may be 
detrimental to the interest of the principal. The 
process of aligning these two interests can 
ignite conflict between the two interest groups. 
According to Muhammad, Sheila, Hafiz and 
Ahmad (2011), there are two factors that give 
prominence to agency theory. First, the theory 
is simple conceptually and it reduces every 
corporation to include only two participant 
owners; (shareholders) and managers. Second, 
there is a notion that human beings are self-
interested and have the tendency to pursue self 
financial enhancement goals at the expense of 
the owners. Agency theory therefore explains 
the relationship between owners and managers 
and that managers should continuously protect 
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the interest of absentee owners (Mansur and 
Ahmad 2013). 
       The theoretical framework of this research 
relies on both Agency and stakeholders‟ 
theories respectively because it allows 
managers to have clear focus on individual 
whose interest they serve. Also, the nature of 
banks make it possible for myriad of 
individuals to various interest in the operations 
of the bank, hence, stakeholders‟ theory remain 
extremely relevant in explaining the subject 
matter of this study.  
 
Review of Empirical Studies 
       The relationship between Board Structure 
and asset quality of banks are reviewed under 
each variable (Board Size and Board 
Independence). 
      Board Size and Asset Quality 
      Javad and Sheikh (n.d.) examined the 
efficacy of bank governance measures in 
improving the quality of assets of banks in 
Bangladesh. The study covered a period of ten 
years (1999-2008) and was carried out on 15 
sampled commercial banks. Corporate 
governance was measured by board size and 
other corporate governance  variables while 
Asset quality (non performing loan) was used 
to measure efficiency. Both descriptive and 
regression analyses were used to analyze the 
data retrieved from the annual financial 
statement of the sampled banks. The study 
concluded that there is a significant positive 
relationship between board size and non 
performing loans of the sampled banks. From 
their analyses, it was reported that an 
additional increase in board size will aggravate 
non performing loan by 3.7% which will 
worsen banks‟ asset quality.  
       Also, Wei-Kang, Wen-Min and Yi-Ling 
(2012) examined the role of corporate 
governance on Bank Holding Companies 
(BHC), evidence from U.S. commercial banks. 
The study used Board size and other corporate 
governance variables as independent variables, 
CAMEL rating was used to assess the 
performance of the banks and descriptive 
statistics, correlation and regression analysis 
were employed in establishing the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms 
and some performance variables which include 
asset quality. It was found that, board size has 
significant positive impact on asset quality. 
The findings of this study revealed that the 
proportion of non-performing loan to total 
loan, non-performing to total asset will 
continue to increase thereby worsening the 
asset quality of banks as a result increment in 
board size.  This position is same as the finding 
of  Rong et al. (n.d.) who also found a positive 
significant relationship between board size and 
non-performing loans. 
       Lorne and Wang (2013) assessed the 
relationship between credit risk of banks and 
corporate governance structure of some U.S. 
commercial banks using cumulative loan 
default probability and risk taken behavior as 
dependent variables while board size and other 
corporate governance variables were used as 
independent variables. It was found that a 
significant positive relationship exists between 
default rate and board size. This shows that 
larger board size may heighten the rate of non-
performing loan thereby worsening the asset 
quality of banks. 
       This finding is in line with the finding of 
ping-fu (2014) who examined the effect of 
corporate governance in the financial 
performance to Asian banks through multiple 
linear regression analysis. Board Size and 
board meetings were used as proxies for 
corporate governance while non-performing 
loan among other variable were used as proxies 
for measuring asset quality. The study 
concluded that there is a negative and 
significant relationship between board size and 
non performing loan. This means that an 
increase in board size will reduce non 
performing loan thereby improving the asset 
quality of the banks.  
       Ravi and Martin (2013) examined the 
effects of corporate governance on the 
efficiency of Nepalese Commercial Banks 
using 29 out of 31 banks in Nepal for a period 
of 7 years (2005-2011).various corporate 
governance variables were used to establish 
relationship with non-performing loan of the 
sampled banks. Data for the study were 
retrieved from the annual financial statements 
of the banks and regression analysis was used 
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to establish the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The 
study found a negative significant relationship 
between board size and non performing loan 
which shows that larger board size decreases 
the rate of non-performing loan (NPL) and 
which invariably improves efficiency.  
        On the other hand, Terzungwe and Simon 
(2013) carried out investigative study on the 
impact of corporate governance on non 
performing loan of banks in Nigeria. The study 
utilized data from the financial statements of 
14 quoted banks and multivariate regression 
analysis was used to establish the relationship 
between corporate governance variables non-
performing loans. The study found no 
significant relationship between board size 
non-performing loans. By implication, board 
size cannot be relied upon to check the rising 
rate of non-performing which exist in Nigerian 
banks. 
 
       Board Independence and Asset Quality 
       Wei-Kang, et al. (2012) examined the role 
of corporate governance on Bank Holding 
Companies (BHC), evidence from U.S. 
commercial banks. CAMEL rating was used to 
assess the performance of the banks and 
descriptive statistics, correlation and regression 
analyses were employed to establish the 
relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and some performance variables 
which include asset quality measured by non-
performing loans. It was found that, board 
independence (board independence) has 
significant positive impact on asset quality. 
The findings of this study revealed that the 
proportion of non-performing loan to total 
loan, non-performing loan to total asset will 
continue to increase thereby worsening the 
asset quality of banks as a result increment in 
the proportion of independent directors on the 
board.  
       Also, the study by Liag, Pisun and 
Jiraporn (n.d.), on Board Characteristics and 
Chinese banks‟ performance used a sample of 
50 largest Chinese banks between 2003 and 
2010. Asset quality was used as dependent 
variable measured by non-performing loans, 
while board size and board composition were 
used as proxies for board characteristics. They 
found a positive significant relationship 
between board composition and asset quality.  
       Lorne and Wang (2013) examined the 
relationship between credit risk of banks and 
corporate governance structure of some U.S. 
commercial banks the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank loans default 
rate was established using regression analysis 
and it was found that board independence has 
significant positive relationship with default 
rate. This shows that, higher proportion of 
independent directors on the board worsens 
banks‟ default rate thereby deteriorating the 
asset quality of the sampled banks.  
       On the contrary to the above conclusions, 
there are also findings that support higher 
proportion of independent directors. For 
instance, Wei, et al. (2011) found in their study 
that higher percentage of outside director on 
the board leads to better asset quality as there 
is a negative significant relationship between 
the proportion of independent directors and 
bank asset quality. 
       Ravi and Martin (2013) also found a 
negative significant relationship between non- 
performing loans and board independence. 
This finding is premised on the fact that 
independent directors have proficiency to assist 
managers on loan administration and recovery 
process and as such, increment in board 
independence will mitigate the rate of non-
performing loan in banks.  
      Terzungwe and Simon (2013) concluded 
that there is no significant relationship between 
board independence and asset quality of banks 
in Nigeria and as such independent directors 
cannot be relied upon to check the rising rate 
of non-performing which exist in Nigerian 
banks. 
 
Control Variables and Asset Quality 
 The relationship between control variables and 
asset quality are reviewed below: 
 
       Firm Size and Asset Quality 
       Wei-Kang et al. (2012) examined the role 
of corporate governance on Bank Holding 
Companies (BHC), evidence from U.S. 
Commercial Banks. CAMEL rating was used 
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to assess the performance of the banks and 
descriptive statistics, correlation and regression 
analyses were employed to establish the 
relationship among the variables for the study. 
They found no significant relationship between 
firm size and asset quality. The implication of 
this finding is that firm size does not determine 
the quality of asset of banks. 
       On the other hand, Muhammed et al. 
(2011) and Bill et al. (2012) in their respective 
studies found a significant negative 
relationship between firm size and asset quality 
(non-performing loans). This implies that 
larger firms have been able to use their sizes to 
reduce the rate of loan default in banks, non-
performing loans and cushion the effect of loan 
defaults than smaller firms. 
 
      Firm Age and Asset Quality 
      Firm age is the number of years a bank has 
been in existence since listed on the Stock 
Exchange. It is expected that older banks 
should be able to use their long term 
experience to enhance the asset quality of their 
banks. The study by Wei-Kang et al. (2012) 
which examined the role of corporate 
governance on Bank Holding Companies 
(BHC), evidence from U.S. revealed a contrary 
finding as they found a significant positive 
relationship between firm age and asset 
quality. It therefore shows that, it is not how 
old a firm is that determine the quality of its 
asset as relatively new firms may have better 
asset quality than older firms. 
  
METODOLOGY 
       This study employs ex-post facto research 
design using panel data for the periods under 
study (2008-2017). Ex-post facto research 
design allows for multi dimensional data about 
past events to be studied in order to ascertain 
the causes and effects of the phenomenon. The 
study uses ex-post facto research design 
because it aims at examining the impact of 
Board Structure on asset quality of listed 
deposit money banks in Nigeria which requires 
data from published financial statements (past 
records) of the banks. 
  
Population and Sample Size 
       The study used all the banks listed on the 
Nigeria Stock Exchange as at December, 2017 
as population of the study. This is because the 
study is concerned with listed deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. It is believed that only listed 
banks would comply fully with the 
requirements of CBN code of corporate 
governance. As at December 2017, there are 
fifteen (15) banks quoted on the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange. 
The study‟s sample size consists of all banks 
that were listed on or before 2008 and remain 
listed up till December, 2017. Using this filter, 
all the banks were meet up with the 
requirement and were all taking as the 
sampling frame for the study.  
 
Sources and Methods of Data Collection  
       The choice of source of data for a study 
depends solely on the variables being 
examined. This study seeks to examine the 
relationship between board structure and asset 
quality of listed deposit money banks in 
Nigeria. The required data will be 
quantitatively extracted from the published 
annual accounts and reports of the banks under 
study covering a period of 10 years (2008-
2017). This method of data collection 
(quantitative) is adopted because it suits the 
research design for this study which requires 
the study of past events in establishing the 
relationship between board structure and asset 
quality of deposit money banks in Nigeria.   
 
Variables Specification and Measurement 
       For the purpose of achieving the objective 
of this study, three categories of variables were 
employed. These are: (i) Dependent variables 
(NPL and LDR), Independent Variables (BS 
and BI) and Control Variables (FS and FA). 
These variables are explained below. 
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are: 
 
       Non-Performing Loans Ratio (NPL)  
       This is the amount of total loans and 
advances that has been in default with respect 
to the repayment of both the principal and 
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interest for 90 days and beyond. In measuring 
Non-Performing loans the measurement used 
by Ravi and Martin (2013) will be adopted 
which is the total amount of loan in default 
divided by total loans and advance. 
 
       Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) 
       This ratio tests the proportion of banks‟ 
deposits that have been used to finance loans 
and advances. Banks with higher loan to 
deposit ratio may find it difficult to meet 
depositors‟ need for cash and this situation 
may become worse when a larger proportion of 
the loan is non-performing. In measuring LDR, 
this study took a clue from Kolapo and Ayeni 
(2012) who measured loan to deposit ratio as 
total loans and advances divided by total 
deposit. 
 
Independent Variables    
Independent variable used in this study is 
board structure proxied by both board size and 
board independence.  
 
       Board Size (BS) 
       This is the total number of directors sitting 
on the board of each bank which in line with 
the code of corporate governance should not be 
more than 20 members. This study will 
examine the extent to which asset quality will 
be affected by the size of the board. In line 
with Ravi and Martin (2013) board size will be 
measured by the total number of directors on 
the board at the end of each year. 
 
 
 
       Board Independence (BI) 
       The code of corporate governance 
specified that an effective board should have 
more independent directors. Going by this 
specification, board independence is the 
number of non- executive directors on the 
board and it is measured as the ratio of outside 
directors (non executive directors) to total 
board size at the end of the year. Ravi and 
Martin (2013) and Ahmad (2013) also used the 
same method to measure board independence. 
 
Control Variables  
       Control variables will be introduced into 
the model for this study to account for other 
factors that may likely affect asset quality 
which are not captured by the corporate 
governance proxies. Two control variables 
(Firm size and Age of the firm) will be 
included in the model for this study.  
 
      Firm Size (FS) 
      Firm size will be measured by the natural 
log of the total assets of each bank. Using this 
measurement, the study follows Muhammad et 
al. (2013). 
 
      Firm Age (FA) 
      Age of the firm will be considered by 
adopting the measurement used by Ishaq (n.d.) 
who measured firm‟s age by the number of 
years after being listed on the Nigeria stock 
exchange. 
Summary of all the variables as well as the 
measurement for each variable is shown in the 
Table 1. 
Table1 1. Showing variables and applicable measurements 
Dependent Variables Measurements 
Non-Performing Loan Ratio of non-performing loan to total loans and advances 
Loan to deposit ratio Total loan divide by total deposit 
Independent variables  
Board Size (BS) Total number of director sitting on the board 
Board Independence 
(BI) 
Number of non-executive directors divide by total number of 
directors 
Control variables  
Firm Size (FS) Natural logarithm of each bank‟s total assets 
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Dependent Variables Measurements 
Firm Age (FA) Number of years passed after listing on the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange 
Source: Generated by the Authors’ 2018 
 
Method of Data Analysis   
       The study employed various robustness 
tests to ensure that data set are free from errors 
capable of invalidating the findings of this 
study. To this end, Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) test was carried out on the variables to 
check for the existence of multi-collinearity. 
Also, heteroscedasticity test was conducted as 
a form of diagnostic test for the model. There 
is presence of heteroscedasticity when there is 
unequal variability in the variables across the 
range of values of the predictor variable(s). 
Where the probability value of 
heterocedasticity test is less than 5%, then 
there is presence of heteroskedasticity which 
will require Ordinary Least Square Robust 
regression to correct the unequal variability of 
the predictor variables. Finally, Hausman 
specification test was conducted to ascertain 
which between Fixed Effect Method (FEM) 
and Random Effect Method (REM) of 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) regression 
analysis was more appropriate for the analysis. 
All the analyses will be done with the aid of 
Stata version 11.  
       Descriptive statistics was used to 
summarize the data and describe the 
phenomenon associated with the variables, 
while correlation analysis was used to establish 
the relationship between the variables, 
ascertain the predictive power of the 
independent variables and check the existence 
of multi-collinearity. According to Gujarati 
and Porter (as cited in Ajoka, Iyoha & 
Obigbemi, 2014), the threshold for the 
identification of multi-collinearity is a 
correlation coefficient of 0.8 and this level of 
correlation can be harmful for the regression as 
it reduces the reliability and the predictive 
power of the variables.  
 Finally, the outcome of Hausman 
specification test favoured the use Random 
Effect GLS but the result of the 
heteroskedasticity test revealed that the data 
are heteroskedastic which the study resolved 
through OLS Robust regression. To this end, 
OLS robust regression results were presented 
interpreted for the study.    
 
Model Specification 
       This study adopts and modifies the 
econometric model used by Daniya, et al. 
(2016) which is given as follows:  
 
Yit = a0 + β 1 CGit + β2Cit + eit ------------(1) 
 
Where:  
Yit  Represents bank performance variable in 
time t; 
a0   Is the constant term. It is a partial slope or 
multiple regression co-efficient that 
explains the rate of change in the 
dependent variable as a result of 
increasing or decreasing the value of the 
independent variable by one more unit 
while holding other variables constant.  
CGit Is a vector of corporate governance 
variables 
Cit     Is a vector of control variables 
 eit,    Is the error term 
The model is modified thus; 
 
Yit = a0 + β 1 CGit + β2 Cit + eit ------------(2)   
Yit = a0 + β1 BSit + β2 BIit + β3 FSit + β4 FAit + eit -
---------------(3) 
 
All independent as well as the control variables 
respectively have been inputted into the model. 
Since the dependent variable for the study is 
Asset Quality, this study replaced Yit  
(performance with AQit (Asset Quality) 
 
AQit = a0 + β1 BSit + β2 BIit + β3 FSit + β4 FAit + 
eit -----------------(4) 
 
The dependent variable (AQ) has been 
introduced into the function. Hence the model 
for this study is developed. However, this will 
further be modified to incorporate the two 
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proxies for Asset Quality (NPL and LDR). 
This gave birth to two regression models as 
stated below. 
 
NPLit = a0 + β1 BSit + β2 BIit + β3 FSit + β4 FAit + 
eit -----------------(5) 
LDRit = a0 + β1 BSit + β2 BIit + β3 FSit + β4 FAit + 
eit -----------------(6) 
 
Where: NPL=Non-Performing Loans, LDR = 
Loan to Deposit Ratio, BS=Board Size, BI= 
Board Independence, FS= Firm Size, FA= 
Firm Age 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The results of the analyses are presented and 
discussed as follows 
 
Robustness Tests 
       The presence or otherwise of munti-
collinearity was ascertained via Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) test which was 
conducted on the predictor (independent) 
variables. The result of the test shows a mean 
VIF of 1.14 which is less than the threshold of 
ten (10) established by Gujarati (2004) and this 
showed absence of multi-collinearity. Also, the 
result of the Hausman specification test 
revealed that the variables are correlated with a 
Chi-Square probability value of 0.5565 which 
is above 5%. Consequent upon the outcome of 
Hausman test, Random Effect (RE) method of 
GLS regression is considered suitable for the 
study. However, the result of the 
hetroskedasticity test which also helped to 
determine the fitness of the regression model 
revealed that the data set are heteroskedastic 
owing to chi-square probability of 0.0111 and 
0.0000 for both models. The presence of 
heteroskedsticity requires the use of Robust 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to 
correct the unequal variability in the predictor 
variables. To this end, the study therefore, 
deemed Robust OLS regression fit for the 
study owing to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
       The results of the summary statistics for 
the variables are shown in Table 2. This helped 
to provide detailed understanding of the nature 
and behavior of the data upon which analysis 
was carried out. Various statistical measures 
used to describe the data include; measures of 
central tendency (Mean), measure of 
dispersion (standard deviation) which 
ascertained the level of spread and distribution 
of the variables as well as the minimum and 
maximum values for each dependent and 
independent variables respectively
.
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variables OBS Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
NPL     150 0.5873006 0.5510927 0.0005906 2.763587 
LDR     150 0.1789775 0.255381 0.0001298 2.441722 
BS     150 14.45714 2.160374       9      20 
BI     150 0.5946397 0.105704 0.3636364       1 
FS     150 27.04467 1.407145 18.9757 30.01667 
FA     150 19.57143 13.44701       9      44 
      
Source: Generated from the annual reports of DMBs through ‘stata’ 
Table 2. Shows the number of observations 
across the variables to be 150 which confirms 
that the study covers fifteen (15) listed deposit 
money banks for a period of ten (10) years.  
From table 2, the average NPL is 0.5873 which 
depicted a rising rate of non-performing loan 
and the result of the measure of dispersion 
showed that banks vary greatly in their rate of 
NPL. The average Loan to Deposit Ration of 
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Nigerian banks is 0.1789775 which revealed 
that about 18% of depositor‟s deposit on the 
average is advance to customers as loans. 
However, this vary greatly among banks giving 
the standard deviation value of 0.255381.   
       The average board size of deposit money 
banks in Nigeria is fourteen (14) with a 
minimum board size of nine (9) and a 
maximum board size of twenty (20). The 
maximum board size is in line with the 
maximum number of director required to sit on 
the board of each bank by the 2006 code of 
corporate governance. The standard deviation 
of 2.160 shows that bank vary slightly in the 
choice of number of directors on the board 
within the periods under study. 
With respect to board independence, the mean 
value of 0.595 shows that about 60% board 
members consists of non-executive directors. 
This is consistent with the requirement of the 
2006 code of corporate governance (the 
number of non-executive directors should be 
more them the executive directors). This shows 
a good board representation. 
       Banks size measured by the natural log of 
each bank‟s total asset has a mean value of 
twenty seven (27) with a minimum value of 
approximately nineteen (19) and a maximum 
value of thirty (30). The standard deviation 
value of 1.407 shows that banks have relatively 
varying values of total assets. The average total 
asset size of the studied banks is close to the 
maximum value and this boost could be the 
resultant effect of the 2005 consolidation 
exercise by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN). 
       The age of banks in Nigeria measured by 
the number of years of each bank since listed 
on the Nigerian stock exchange shows an 
average age of 19.57 and considering the 
minimum age of nine (9) years and a 
maximum age of forty four (44) years, it is 
clear that some banks in Nigeria are still in 
their infant stage and they vary greatly in their 
respective ages as indicated by the standard 
deviation value of 13.4470. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
       Table 3. presents the correlation 
coefficients of the Dependent Variables (NPL 
and LDR,), Independent Variables (Board 
Size, Board Independence) and Control 
Variables (Firm Size and Firm Age). This is 
necessary to establish the relationship between 
the explanatory and the explained variables 
respectively
.
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables. 
 NPL LDR BS BI FA FS 
NPL 1.0000      
LDR -0.0608 1.0000     
BS -0.0621 0.0092 1.0000    
BI 0.1092 0.1030 -0.1602 1.0000   
FA 0.1039 0.0025 0.2213 -0.1251 1.0000  
FS -0.0566 0.0316 0.2748 -0.0254 0.2817 1.0000 
Source: Generated from the annual reports of DMBs through ‘stata’ 
 
The result of the correlation as shown in Table 
3. shows the correlation coefficients of the 
variables which range from -1 to 1 with 
indicative signs (positive and negative) that 
denote the pattern or direction of relationship. 
The diagonal correlation coefficients of 1.0000 
shows that each variable has a perfect positive 
linear relationship with itself.  
 
       For the correlated variables, the results 
show that board size and firm size are 
negatively correlated with Non-Performing 
Loan (NPL) while board independence and 
firm Age have positive correlation with non-
performing loan. The negative relationship 
between the explanatory variables and non-
performing loan indicates an inverse 
relationship which means that an increase in 
board size, and firm size will reduce the rate of 
non-performing loan which consequently 
improves the asset quality of deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. Also, the correlation result 
revealed that an increase in board 
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independence and firm age will aggravate non-
performing loan thereby worsening the asset 
quality of deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
 
       The correlation result also reveals the 
relationship between explanatory variables and 
loan to deposit ratio. To this end, Board Size 
(BS), Board Independence (BI), Firm Size (FS) 
and Firm Age (FA) show positive correlation 
with loan to deposit ratio. The implication of 
this is that, an increase in Board Size (BS), 
Board Independence Firm Size (FS) and Firm 
Age (FA) will also increase the proportion of 
depositors‟ funds used to finance loan which 
consequently worsens the asset quality of 
banks in Nigeria. 
 
      Generally, the correlation coefficients for 
each variable show the absence of multi-
collinearity as the highest correlation 
coefficient of 0.2817 which is between Firm 
Size and Firm Age is less than 0.8 threshold. 
This was further confirmed through VIF test 
which also revealed absence of multi-
collineraity. This implies that the explanatory 
variables have high predictive abilities that can 
enhance the reliability of regression findings. 
 
Regression Results 
       Sequel to the outcome of both hausman 
specification and hetroskedasticity tests 
respectively, the study presents and discusses 
the results of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
 
Table 4. OLS Robust Result for models one 
and two respectively. 
Var. NPL LDR NPL LDR 
BS  -0.116 
 (0.555) 
 0.003 
 (0.823) 
-0.019 
(0.394) 
0.001 
(0.978) 
BI  0.531 
 0.206 
 0.259 
 (0244) 
0.609 
(0.143) 
0.344 
(0.157) 
FS     _    _ -0.023 
(0.464) 
0.001 
(0.835) 
FA     _    _ 0.007 
(0.08)* 
0.000 
(0.453) 
R2 0.014 0.012 0.064 0.033 
F stat 1.07 1.03 2.65 1.84 
p-val 0.344 0.359 0.010 0.074 
 
Note: The coefficients for each variable are 
shown in italics while their respective p-values 
are in parenthesis. Variable that shows 
significant relationship with asset quality is 
shown in asterisk. The p-values of variables for 
the two models are 6% and 3% and they are 
statistically significant at 1% and 7% 
respectively as shown by the p-values of 0.01 
for NPL and 0.07 for LDR. The regression was 
carried out in sequence for each model where 
each independent variable was first regressed 
with each dependent variable and finally all the 
dependent variables together with the control 
variables were regressed against each of the 
dependent variables.  
 
  Board Structure and Asset Quality 
      The OLS robust result shown in Table 4. 
also revealed the relationship between board 
structure (board size and board independence) 
and asset quality (NPL and LDR). Board size 
shows a negative relationship with NPL and a 
positive relationship with LDR. This signifies 
that an increase in BS will reduce the rate of 
loan default and increase the amount of 
depositors‟ fund used to finance loan. 
However, the relationship between board size 
and asset quality is not significant. 
      Also, there is an insignificant positive 
relationship between board independence and 
NPL and LDR. This implies that board 
independence aggravates non performing loan 
as well as the proportion of depositors fund 
used to finance loan and this worsens asset 
quality of banks. From the above findings, it is 
clear that there is no significant relationship 
between board structure and asset quality of 
banks. 
      Consequent upon the above findings, 
where board structure proxies showed 
insignificant relationship with asset quality 
proxies, the study therefore conclude that 
Board Structure has no significant relationship 
with Asset Quality of deposit money banks in 
Nigeria. 
 
 Firm Size, Age and Asset Quality 
     Table 4. shows the relationship between the 
control variables (firm size and firm age) and 
asset quality (NPL and LDR). The result shows 
that firm size has a negative and insignificant 
relationship with NPL and a positive 
insignificant relationship with LDR. This 
JURNAL RISET AKUNTANSI DAN KEUANGAN, 7 (1), 2019, 1-18 
 
15 | Jurnal Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Vol.7 | No.1 | 2019 
 
shows that bigger banks (asset size) have been 
able to reduce loan default and improve asset 
quality but the proportion of depositors‟ funds 
used to finance is high among such banks. 
Firm age has a significant positive relationship 
with NPL and has no relationship with LDR.         
This suggests that, an increase in firm age will 
increase non-performing loan and 
consequently deteriorates banks‟ asset quality. 
The result shows that older banks have not 
been able to use their years of experience in 
banking practice to improve asset quality. This 
position is consistent with the finding of (Wei-
Kang et al., 2012). 
 
 Conclusions and Recommendations  
      This study has examined the relationship 
between board structure of listed deposit 
money banks in Nigeria vis avis the asset 
quality using firm size and age respectively as 
control variables for a period ten (10) years 
(2018-2017). The results of the study revealed 
that no bank has board size above the 
maximum limit of twenty (20) members 
prescribed by the code of corporate 
governance. Also the proportion of non-
executive directors serving in the boards of 
banks in Nigeria is higher than those of 
executive directors. Though banks are at 
liberty to appoint independent directors, those 
independent directors have not been able to 
improve asset quality of banks in Nigeria. This 
could be as result poor commitment to duty, 
connivance with the executive directors and 
lackadaisical attitude towards loan 
administration. This is apparent from the rising 
rate of non-performing loan and increased 
proportion of depositors‟ funds used to finance 
loan owing to an increase in board 
independence.     The result of the summary 
statistics shows that, the proportion of 
depositors‟ funds used to finance loan as well 
as the proportion of non-performing loan to 
total loans/advances are relatively high. Also, 
bigger banks have been able to use their sizes 
to mitigate the rising rate of non-performing 
loan thereby improving asset quality better 
than smaller (total assets) banks. Finally, it is 
evident from the study that the rate of non-
performing loan goes higher as banks grow 
older. 
 
Sequel to the above findings, the following 
recommendations have been suggested. It 
hoped that proper implementation and 
application of these recommendations will go a 
long way in improving banks‟ asset quality.     
 Banks‟ non executive directors should 
be encouraged to be committed and dedicated 
to their responsibilities so as to use their wealth 
of experience and credibility to effectively 
monitor the activities of the directors 
particularly with respect to loan administration. 
 Older banks should cajoled to use their 
long years of existence to improve the asset 
quality via close monitoring of the regulatory 
authorities coupled with commensurate 
sanctions for non-compliance.  
 The average board size of the studied 
banks should be sustained as it improves the 
asset quality of banks. However, they have to 
be motivated to be committed to the service of 
the banks in order to significantly improve 
asset quality. 
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